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THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: COMPLEMENTARITY AS  
A STRENGTH OR A WEAKNESS? 
LINDA E. CARTER∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
The “complementarity” principle that shapes the relationship of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) with national jurisdictions is both 
criticized and applauded. The idea is that states have the primary 
responsibility to investigate and prosecute the crimes1 in the Rome 
Statute,2 with the ICC as a backup court.3 The built-in deference, or 
complementarity, of the ICC to national prosecutions respects state 
sovereignty and places significant control within national jurisdictions. At 
the same time, the ICC’s secondary role arguably weakens the Court’s 
position as a means to achieve accountability for genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes.  
This Essay examines the strengths and weaknesses of the 
complementarity principle. The Essay then considers reconceptualizing the 
“success” of the ICC from an expectation of adjudicating cases to an 
expectation of fostering national prosecutions. If the ICC’s role is viewed 
through the lens of increasing the capacity of national jurisdictions to 
adjudicate international crimes, the measures of the ICC’s success will 
move from its own prosecutions to efforts to educate, assist, and facilitate 
national prosecutions. The focus on assisting in the development of 
national capacity is sometimes called “positive complementarity.”4 This 
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 1. Throughout this Essay, the terms “international crimes,” “ICC crimes,” and “Rome Statute 
crimes” will be used interchangeably with the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes that are in the Rome Statute.  
 2. The Rome Statute is the treaty that created the ICC.  
 3. See WILLIAM SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY ON 
THE ROME STATUTE 50–53 (2010) (discussing development of complementarity concept); ROY S. 
LEE, INTRODUCTION, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME 
STATUTE 27–28 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999) (discussing the role of complementarity in the drafting of the 
Rome Statute). 
 4. Report of the Bureau on Stocktaking: Complementarity to the 8th Session of the Assembly of 
States Parties (ASP), Mar. 22–25, 2010, Doc. ICC-ASP/8/51, ¶ 16 (Mar. 18, 2010) [hereinafter Bureau 
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emphasis, in turn, should suggest a different strategy for the ICC in 
developing national capacities. Recommendations for how the ICC can 
increase its role in developing national capacities are proposed, including 
the establishment of an Institute or Center. While complementarity could 
prove to be either a strength or a weakness, the Essay concludes that, with 
a revised definition of success and a stronger focus on capacity building, 
complementarity likely will prove to be a strength of the ICC as an 
institution.  
I. COMPLEMENTARITY AND THE ROME STATUTE 
The Preamble to the Rome Statute, the treaty through which the ICC 
was established,5 expressly recognizes the importance of complementarity: 
 the International Criminal Court established under this Statute 
shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. . .6 
The idea that the ICC will be secondary to prosecutions in national 
jurisdictions is strikingly different from the ad hoc international criminal 
tribunals created by the United Nations Security Council for adjudicating 
cases from the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Both the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) are based on a principle of 
“primacy.” Those tribunals can preempt a prosecution in a national 
jurisdiction if the tribunal decides to proceed.7 The Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (SCSL), a tribunal established by agreement between the 
government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations, similarly operates 
under a primacy principle.8 Part of the reasoning behind adopting a 
 
 
Report to ASP 8] (“[P]ositive complementarity refers to all activities/actions whereby national 
jurisdictions are strengthened and enabled to conduct genuine national investigations and trials of 
crimes included in the Rome Statute, without involving the Court in capacity building, financial 
support and technical assistance, but instead leaving these actions and activities for States, to assist 
each other on a voluntary basis.”); ICC Prosecutorial Strategy 2009–2012, ¶¶ 16–17 (Feb. 1, 2010), 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/66A8DCDC-3650-4514-AA62-D229D1128F65/281 
506/OTPProsecutorialStrategy20092013.pdf (defining “positive complementarity” as “a proactive 
policy of cooperation aimed at promoting national proceedings”); see also William W. Burke-White, 
Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome 
System of International Justice, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53 n.4 (2008) (suggesting that “proactive” is a 
more accurate term than “positive” complementarity).  
 5. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court pmbl, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 
[hereinafter “Rome Statute”], available at http://icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/legal%20texts%20and%20 
tools/official%20journal/Pages/rome%20statute.aspx. 
 6. Id. 
 7. ICTY Statute art. 9; ICTR Statute art. 8. 
 8. SCSL Statute art. 8. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss3/8
  
 
 
 
 
2013] THE FUTURE OF THE ICC 453 
 
 
 
 
complementarity approach with the ICC was to balance a concern for state 
sovereignty with the creation of an international authority by giving states 
the first option to prosecute cases.9 The effect of complementarity should 
be to encourage national prosecutions for genocide, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity.10 
In addition to the general language in the Preamble, Article 17 of the 
Rome Statute in particular implements the principle of complementarity. 
Article 17 sets out the admissibility standards for cases before the Court. 
Cases are not admissible in the ICC if a state with jurisdiction (1) is 
investigating or prosecuting the case,11 (2) has investigated and decided 
not to prosecute,12 or (3) has already tried the individual for the conduct 
and the retrial would be barred under the ne bis in idem provisions of the 
statute.13 A case is also inadmissible for a fourth reason if it is not of 
“sufficient gravity.”14 The first three reasons to reject admissibility of a 
case in the ICC directly reflect deference to national prosecutions. The 
only exception15 occurs when a state with jurisdiction is “unwilling or 
 
 
 9. See JANN K. KLEFFNER, COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE ROME STATUTE AND NATIONAL 
CRIMINAL JURISDICTIONS 95–97 (2008) [hereinafter KLEFFNER, COMPLEMENTARITY] (describing 
the importance of state sovereignty in the negotiations over the complementarity provisions); John T. 
Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE 
MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 41, 74 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999) (describing the importance of the 
complementarity structure to the balance with sovereignty and support for the treaty); Michael A. 
Newton, The Complementarity Conundrum: Are we Watching Evolution or Evisceration?, 8 SANTA 
CLARA J. INT’L L. 115, 120–23 (2010) (commenting on the relationship between the sovereignty of 
states and the role of complementarity in obtaining states’ agreement to the ICC); Leila Nadya Sadat & 
S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 
415 (2000) (noting that the treaty would likely have been unacceptable to many states if the ICC had 
been given greater jurisdiction; also commenting on the negative effect of complementarity on 
cooperation with the Court). 
 10. See KLEFFNER, COMPLEMENTARITY, supra note 9, at 309–12 (describing the role of 
complementarity as a catalyst for states for states to improve their judicial systems and to adjudicate 
cases of international crimes); Kevin Jon Heller, A Sentence-Based Theory of Complementarity, 53 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 85, 126–27 (2012) (noting that states are more likely to ratify the Rome Treaty if 
they believe they can preempt the Court through national prosecutions and suggesting that a sentence-
based approach to determining the willingness and ability of a state to handle a case would maximize 
state support for the ICC because the prosecutions could be for ordinary crimes with sentences 
comparable to ICC-imposed sentences); Newton, supra note 9, at 146–47 (commenting on the need for 
states to implement ICC crimes domestically in order to meet the requirement of state investigation 
and prosecution); Jann K. Kleffner, The Impact of Complementarity on National Implementation of 
Substantive International Criminal Law, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 86, 88–89 (2003) (discussing 
complementarity as an incentive for states to enact international crimes into domestic law).  
 11. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 17(1)(a). 
 12. Id. art. 17(1)(b). 
 13. Id. arts. 17(1)(c), 20. 
 14. Id. art. 17(1)(d). 
 15. Although the language of “unwilling or unable” is not in article 17 (c) on prior prosecution, 
article 20, which specifically addresses ne bis in idem also excepts situations in which a trial was for 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution”16 or “the 
decision [not to prosecute] resulted from the unwillingness or inability of 
the State genuinely to prosecute.”17 Unwillingness occurs when a state is 
shielding a person from criminal responsibility or is conducting 
proceedings “inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to 
justice.”18 Inability arises when a national system is so impacted that it 
cannot proceed with obtaining evidence or trying the individual.19 
It is clear from the Preamble and the purpose of Article 17 that national 
jurisdictions can preempt the ICC from going forward with a case by 
conducting a good faith investigation and a subsequent prosecution or 
decision not to prosecute on the national level. Complementarity is a 
powerful device for national jurisdictions to maintain control of criminal 
matters and to limit the reach of the ICC. The principle is also strong 
motivation for national jurisdictions to prosecute international crimes, 
which in turn is important to an overall goal of the ICC to end impunity 
for atrocities. Given the significant control by states, is complementarity a 
weakness or a strength of the ICC as an institution? The next part 
considers why complementarity might be a weakness and is followed by a 
part that considers why it might be a strength.  
 
 
the purpose of shielding the accused from criminal responsibility or was conducted in a way 
inconsistent with bringing the individual to justice. 
 16. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 17(1)(a). 
 17. Id. art. 17(1)(b). 
 18. Id. art. 17(2)(a)–(c). The provisions state: 
2. In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall consider, having 
regard to the principles of due process recognized by international law, whether one or more 
of the following exist, as applicable: 
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was made for the 
purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court referred to in article 5; 
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the circumstances is 
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice; 
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or impartially, and 
they were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent 
with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice. 
 19. Id. art. 17(3). The provision states: 
3. In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether, due to 
a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is 
unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to 
carry out its proceedings. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss3/8
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II. COMPLEMENTARITY AS A WEAKNESS 
There are at least two primary concerns with complementarity. One is 
inherent in the structure of the ICC, and the other is in the implementation 
of the statutory mandate. 
A. Inherent Problem 
An inherent problem exists because with complementarity the Court is 
secondary to national jurisdictions, and in that sense is weaker than other 
international criminal courts such as the ICTY and ICTR, which have 
primacy over national jurisdictions. One effect of this inherent weakness is 
that the Court wields less authority over the states; the states have the 
option of maintaining the upper hand vis à vis the Court. It is within the 
power of the states to go forward with investigations and prosecutions, 
preempting the Court. If the ICC’s Prosecutor wants to advance a case, 
there may be legal hurdles in the way. This is already happening with 
admissibility challenges to the Court’s jurisdiction by Kenya and Libya.20 
These specific challenges are discussed below as an implementation issue.  
The inherent structure of the relationship of the Court and states may 
be a weakness for another reason. The effect of the secondary status of the 
ICC is that the Court will, and, in fact, should try fewer cases than the 
other international criminal courts. This is a success for the ICC if it 
means national jurisdictions are trying international crimes, but it is also 
qualitatively different from the ICTY and ICTR, which focus on both the 
number of cases tried as well as the fairness of the proceedings.21 The ICC 
is not going to be comparable in numbers of cases and this could be 
viewed as a weakness. However, if we shift the conversation from “no 
cases” to affirmative efforts to build national capacity, then we could 
measure the ICC as an institution based not only on its adjudications, but 
also on its success with establishing national capacity. This redefinition to 
include capacity building as a measure of success would partially alleviate 
the inherent weakness of complementarity.  
 
 
 20. See infra notes 23–28 and accompanying text. 
 21. See, e.g., Judge Khalida Rachid Khan, President of the ICTR, Address to the United Nations 
Security Council (June 6, 2011), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/.ictr.un.org/tabid/155/Default.aspx 
?id=1211 (referring to the importance of fair trials in the ICTR); ICTY, About the ICTY, 
http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY (last visited Dec. 18, 2012) (noting the number of cases 
and that the ICTY “regards its fairness and impartiality to be of paramount importance”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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B. Implementation Problem 
In addition to an inherent issue, there is also an implementation 
concern that complementarity at least indirectly creates a tension between 
the Court and national jurisdictions. This occurs due to admissibility 
challenges and also to the perception that the ICC is focused on weaker 
nations.  
In an admissibility challenge, a state will often be pitting itself against 
the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) in raising the issue whether the ICC or 
the state should investigate or prosecute. Litigation always raises tensions, 
but that pressure is heightened when there is also a political dynamic 
involved. Although a party can bring admissibility challenges, Article 
19(2)(b)–(c)22 provides an avenue for a state to bring the challenge, which 
adds a political dimension.  
To date, two states have challenged the admissibility of cases in the 
ICC.23 Kenya challenged the prosecution of two cases, involving six high-
level government officials and opposition. Pre-Trial Chamber II rejected 
Kenya’s challenge24 and the Appeals Chamber affirmed.25 Legal 
 
 
 22. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 19. 
 23. In a third case, the accused himself challenged admissibility. See Prosecutor v. Katanga & 
Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Germain Katanga Against the 
Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case (Sept. 25, 2009) 
(affirming the Trial Chamber in its decision against Katanga’s admissibility challenge, having found a 
“clear and explicit expression of unwillingness of the DRC to prosecute this case.”). 
 24. There are two cases involving Kenya. Both decisions are substantially the same. Prosecutor 
v. Muthuara et al., Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Application by the Government of 
Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute (May 30, 
2011) (finding that, at the point where the matter is a “case,” the state’s focus must be on the “same 
person” as well as the “same conduct” to successfully mount an admissibility challenge; rejecting 
proffer of subsequent reports by Kenya to establish appropriate investigation because assessment must 
be at the time of the admissibility challenge); see also Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., Case No. ICC-01/09-
01/11, Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the 
Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute (May 30, 2011).  
 25. Prosecutor v. Muthuara et al., Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Judgment on the Appeal of the 
Republic of Kenya against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 Entitled ‘Decision on 
the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to 
Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute’ (Aug. 30, 2011) [hereinafter Muthuara Appeals Decision] (affirming 
test of “same person” and “substantially same conduct” and the Pre-Trial Chamber’s holding that the 
case was admissible against Kenya’s challenge; finding no abuse of discretion in rejecting Kenya’s 
request for more time and to hold an oral hearing). The second Kenya case was resolved in the same 
manner. Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Judgment on the Appeal of the Republic 
of Kenya against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 Entitled ‘Decision on the 
Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to 
Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute’ (Aug. 30, 2011). In both cases, Judge Ušacka dissented. Prosecutor v. 
Muthuara et al., Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Ušacka (Sept. 20, 
2011); Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita 
Ušacka (Sept. 20, 2011) (emphasizing the importance of complementarity in the Rome Statute; finding 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss3/8
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commentators are debating the merits of the analysis by the Court and 
whether this was a proper interpretation of the statute in light of the 
purpose of complementarity.26 In the second case, Libya has challenged 
the admissibility of cases involving two members of Moammar Gaddafi’s 
inner circle. Pre-Trial Chamber I rejected the admissibility challenge with 
regard to one accused, retaining the case in the ICC; the Chamber found 
the case inadmissible, however, with regard to the second accused, which 
leaves jurisdiction with Libya to try the case.27 These issues, too, are much 
debated in commentary and in the press.28  
In part because these are issues of first impression in interpreting the 
statute, they are creating much attention. Embedded in the focus on 
admissibility, however, is the question of who will prevail—the ICC or the 
state? This was never an issue with the ICTY or ICTR. There is the 
potential for the ICC to lose credibility if states believe that decisions 
against them on admissibility are incorrect. Nevertheless, admissibility 
challenges are regulated through the statutory scheme. Although this is 
one part of the tension, there is a principled legal process for resolving 
those issues. Although individual states may take issue with the Court’s 
ruling in a specific case, once the legal analysis is more settled,29 this 
should reduce the current weakness in this aspect of complementarity.  
 
 
that assessment of complementarity should be an ongoing process; finding that the Pre-Trial Chamber 
abused its discretion in failing to recognize the discretion in procedures that would have allowed for 
additional submissions and in overemphasizing expediency in the proceedings). 
 26. See, e.g., Charles Chernor Jalloh, International Decision: Situation in the Republic of Kenya: 
No. ICC-01/09-02/11-274—Judgment on Kenya’s Appeal of Decision Denying Admissibility, 106 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 118, 122–25 (2012) (discussing the strict use and application of a “same person- 
substantially same conduct” test as potentially undermining national efforts to prosecute and 
suggesting that one alternative would have been to suspend or defer prosecution pending further action 
by Kenya). 
 27. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi & Al-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Decision on the 
admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (May 31, 2013); Decision on the admissibility 
of the case against Abdullah Al-Senussi (Oct. 11, 2013).  
 28. Brendan Leanos, Cooperative Justice: Understanding the Future of the International 
Criminal Court Through Its Involvement in Libya, 80 FORDHAM L.R. 2267 (2012) (arguing that the 
ICC should cooperate with Libya to try Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi in Libya); Eric Leonard, Testing the 
ICC: The Politics of Complementarity, JURIST (June 1, 2012, 1:06 PM), http://jurist.org/hotline/2012/ 
06/eric-leonard-libya-ICC.php (postulating that the real issue in the Libya admissibility challenge is 
whether Libya is able to hold a fair trial, but suggesting nonetheless that the trials should be held in 
Libya because “the court should always privilege the principle of complementarity”). 
 29. While the Appeals Chamber affirmed the use of a “same person, same conduct” test for 
determining admissibility, that test is still new and is dependent upon the stage of the proceedings; in 
the Kenya cases, the Appeals Chamber noted that this standard is for “cases” that are past the 
investigation phase. Muthuara Appeals Decision, supra note 25, ¶¶ 34, 41. Given the novelty of 
assessing admissibility, it is likely that the Court will refine the interpretation of the standards. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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More difficult to address than the legal issue of admissibility is a 
tension between the ICC and states that arises from the perception that the 
Court is focusing on weaker nations and, specifically, on African 
countries.30 This tension is an indirect effect of complementarity, but it 
nevertheless poses a potential weakness stemming from the principle. The 
OTP and the Court undoubtedly make decisions that have no direct 
connection to whether a state is strong or weak, but the reality is that 
nations with highly developed legal systems are likely to investigate and 
prosecute on their own, exercising the complementarity provisions. We are 
not likely to see self-referrals from developed countries as has occurred 
with three African nations.31 At this point in time, this tension and 
perception may be somewhat inevitable as an indirect result of 
complementarity, but should dissipate as national capacity to try 
international crimes becomes more widely spread throughout Africa and 
other parts of the world. Thus, complementarity is a potential weakness 
because, indirectly, it may lead to a perception of inequality before the 
ICC if national capacity remains weak. As discussed further below, this 
potential weakness could be decreased by greater emphasis on the ICC as 
a capacity-building institution and greater realization of national capacity.  
III. COMPLEMENTARITY AS A STRENGTH 
There is tremendous potential for complementarity to be a strength of 
the ICC as an institution. First, it is worth noting that states give up less 
sovereignty with complementarity than they would in a system based on 
primacy of an international criminal court.32 With more control left in the 
hands of states, there is likely to be greater support for the Court and states 
are likely to be more willing to be parties to the treaty.33 Despite the 
recalcitrance of several major nations, such as the United States, Russia, 
China, and India, to become states parties, the impressive number of 122 
 
 
 30. Charles Chernor Jalloh, Africa and the International Criminal Court: Collision Course or 
Cooperation?, 34 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 203, 209–11 (2012) (noting the criticism and perception of the 
ICC as focusing on weaker nations and especially those from Africa, but contesting the accuracy of the 
sweeping statements); William A. Schabas, Victor’s Justice: Selecting “Situations” at the 
International Criminal Court, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 535, 549 (2010) (raising the question of a 
political aspect to the decisions to prosecute); Jeremy Sarkin, Enhancing the Legitimacy, Status, and 
Role of the International Criminal Court Globally by Using Transitional Justice and Restorative 
Justice Strategies, 6 INTERDISC. J. HUM. RTS. L. 83–84 (2012) (noting the perception that the ICC is 
focusing only on Africa).  
 31. ICC, The Court Today, Doc. ICC-PIDS-TCT-01-018/12_Eng (Nov. 30, 2012) (Uganda, the 
Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo). 
 32. See supra note 9. 
 33. See supra note 10. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss3/8
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member states34 is evidence of the acceptance and support for the Court. 
The greater the number of states parties, the more legitimacy the ICC will 
have, which, in turn, allows the Court to contribute more to accountability 
for international crimes globally.  
Secondly, complementarity will prove to be a strength if it leads to 
increased national capacity to adjudicate international crimes. Because 
complementarity gives the first option to states to prosecute, states have a 
strong motivation to develop their national capacities to try war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and genocide.35 State capacity provides those 
states with the option to preempt the ICC from hearing a case.  
Moreover, national capacity promotes accountability. Even without the 
complementarity regime, it is not possible to try all international crimes in 
an international court. An increase in the number of national prosecutions 
would include larger numbers of cases and also include lower level 
perpetrators, who are not prosecuted at the international level.36 The ICTY, 
ICTR, SCSL, ECCC, and the ICC are purposely designed to try those who 
are the most responsible for serious crimes.37 While the number of 
prosecutions in the ICTY (161 indictments) is impressive,38 this is still 
 
 
 34. ICC, The States Parties to the Rome Statute, http://icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20 
parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx (last visited Oct. 22, 
2013). 
 35. For example, Uganda has passed laws incorporating the Rome Statute Crimes and created an 
International Crimes Division in their High Court. See Alhagi Marong, Unlocking the Mysteriousness 
of complementarity: In Search of a Forum Conveniens for Trial of the Leaders of the Lord’s 
Resistance Army, 40 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 67, 83–84 (2011).  
 36. The importance of the role of states in prosecuting international crime is also recognized in 
the efforts to promulgate a treaty on crimes against humanity. See George H. Stanton, Why the World 
Needs an International Convention on Crimes Against Humanity, in FORGING A CONVENTION FOR 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 354, 356–57 (Leila Nadya Sadat ed., 2011) (describing the limitations 
of the ICC to prosecute international crimes and the need for domestic laws to effectively punish 
widespread crimes against humanity). 
 37. SCSL Statute art. 1 (“The Special Court shall, except as provided in subparagraph (2), have 
the power to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone 
since 30 November 1996 . . . .”); ECCC Statute art. 6 (“the scope of the prosecution is limited to senior 
leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for the crimes and serious 
violations of Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian law and custom, and international 
conventions recognized by Cambodia, that were committed during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 
January 1979.”); ICTR Statute art. 1 (“The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to 
prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the 
territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations committed in the territory of 
neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994 . . . .”); ICTY Statute art. 1 (“The 
International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 . . . .”); 
Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 1 (“jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of 
international concern”). 
 38. ICTY, Key Figures of Cases, http://www.icty.org/sid/24 (last visited Dec. 18, 2012). 
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only a portion of those who could be held responsible. Similarly, the 
historical antecedent of Nuremberg only focused on 24 major leaders in 
the Nazi regime.39 This is not intended as a criticism of the international 
criminal tribunals; instead, it is meant to emphasize the importance of 
parallel national prosecutions. If the ICC’s complementarity regime 
contributes to the development of national capacity to try genocide, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity, it should be viewed as a strength of 
the system. 
In fact, national prosecutions for war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
and genocide are occurring. It is not possible to determine to what extent 
the ICC has had an effect on the development of national capacity,40 and 
the ICC is still at a young stage. However, it is informational to note that 
national jurisdictions are already engaged in prosecutions of international 
crimes. Although the number of cases may not seem extensive at this point 
in time, we can expect the numbers to rise as states parties enact national 
legislation on the crimes in the Rome Statute and develop their own 
expertise to try the cases. The Coalition for the International Criminal 
Court reports that 59 states parties presently have legislation implementing 
the crimes and 38 have legislation in the works.41 As the number of states 
parties with domestic legislation increases due to implementing the Rome 
Statute crimes for complementarity purposes, the influence of the ICC will 
be more direct. 
An exact figure for the number of prosecutions for genocide, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity is elusive because up-to-date and 
 
 
 39. See BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND 
ITS ENFORCEMENT 30–31 (2d ed. 2010) (24 were indicted; 2 were not tried due to illness and suicide; 
1 was tried in absentia; 21 tried at Nuremberg, with 18 convictions and 3 acquittals). 
 40. In some specific instances, it may be possible to document the impact of the ICC on 
furthering national prosecutions. See, e.g., Burke-White, supra note 4, at 105–07 (noting that 
prosecutions in the DRC were in response to the OTP’s announcement of investigating the situation in 
that country). 
 41. COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, CHART ON THE STATUS OF 
RATIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ROME STATUTE AND THE AGREEMENT ON PRIVILEGES 
AND IMMUNITIES (APIC) 3–39 (2012), available at http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/documents/ 
Global_Ratificationimplementation_chart_May2012.pdf. These are the numbers on enacting the 
crimes into national legislation. The CICC also reports that 65 states have either the crimes or the 
cooperation provisions, or both enacted, and that 35 states have legislation on one or the other in the 
process of enactment. Implementation of the Rome Statute, COALITION FOR THE ICC, http://www 
.coalitionfortheicc.org/?mod=romeimplementation (last visited Feb. 16, 2013). Note, too, that states 
parties to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Jan. 12, 1951, 
78 U.N.T.S. 277, have an obligation to pass domestic legislation to punish genocide; as a result, many 
states have domestic legislation on the crime of genocide. See  WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES 400–01, 435–43 (2d ed. 2009) (for a comprehensive 
discussion of the obligation and of domestic prosecutions for genocide). 
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comprehensive databases do not exist.42 Our research so far has yielded 
the following data for prosecutions from 2002 to the present time:43 
20 prosecutions for genocide 
46 prosecutions for war crimes and  
67 prosecutions for crimes against humanity 
The distribution of the prosecutions around the world and the variety of 
conflicts from which they arise is also of interest.44 Many of the national 
prosecutions relate to the former Yugoslavia and to Rwanda. However, 
others relate to Guatemala, Argentina, Iraq, and the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo.45 Moreover, some prosecutions are occurring in the 
countries in which the crimes occurred while others are taking place 
through universal jurisdiction in countries without a direct connection to 
the crimes other than having the accused in custody. For example, 
prosecutions have occurred or are occurring in Canada, Norway, France, 
Germany, Spain, and Belgium for crimes that occurred during the 
Rwandan genocide.46 
In addition to the numbers of prosecutions, the structures within 
national jurisdictions are becoming more sophisticated. For example, 
 
 
 42. Moreover, there are prosecutions for murder, maltreatment of prisoners, and other crimes that 
could be labeled as crimes against humanity or war crimes that are not; instead they are prosecuted 
under a more ordinary crime label. Nevertheless, they do represent national efforts to prosecute 
atrocities. For example, although they probably could have been prosecuted for war crimes, the U.S. 
soldiers who abused Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib were prosecuted for assault, maltreatment of 
prisoners, and dereliction of duty. See, e.g., United States v. Graner, 69 M.J. 104, 105 (C.A.A.F. 2010) 
(convicted of convicted of maltreatment of persons subject to his orders, conspiracy, assault, indecent 
acts and dereliction of duty). One can criticize the prosecutions for the ordinary crimes as insufficient 
or as not going far enough up the ladder of officials, but at least this is a form of accountability. 
 43. Lists of sources and individual cases are on file with author and the Washington University 
Global Studies Law Review [hereinafter “List”]. 
 44. These numbers include completed prosecutions, whether convictions, acquittals, or 
dismissals for other reasons, and pending prosecutions. List, supra note 43. There are additional cases 
that are referenced in other sources. See, e.g., Burke-White, supra note 4, at 106 (referring to 48 
prosecutions for crimes against humanity and 2 for war crimes in the DRC). If one also counts all 
convictions in the Rwandan Gacaca courts as genocide convictions, there would be almost 2 million 
more genocide cases. See Gacaca Closes Shop, NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE FIGHT AGAINST GENOCIDE 
(June 19, 2012), http://cnlg.gov.rw/news/12/06/19/gacaca-closes-shop. The Gacaca proceedings were 
not included in our calculations here because they are an alternative to a regular judicial proceeding; 
only cases that were before national courts were counted. 
 45. See supra note 43.  
 46. It is also worth noting that some of the national prosecutions are occurring due to referrals by 
international criminal courts. The ICTR has referred two to France and two to Rwanda; the ICTY has 
referred 6 cases to Bosnia and 2 to Croatia. Transfer of Cases, ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sections/The 
Cases/TransferofCases (last visited Dec. 18, 2012); Status of Cases, ICTR, http://www.unictr.org/ 
Cases/tabid/204/Default.aspx (last visited Dec. 18, 2012). 
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Uganda has an International Crimes Division (“ICD”) in their High 
Court47 with three highly trained and qualified judges in place. The 
specialized division promotes significant national expertise.  
Some of the motivation for these developments, such as the ICD in 
Uganda, can be attributed, at least in part, to the complementarity 
regime.48 In general, the important point is that, given the large number of 
states parties to the Rome Treaty, complementarity is going to contribute 
to greater awareness and interest in prosecuting international crimes in the 
future. If the ICC’s accomplishments are measured at least in part by the 
increase in national prosecutions due to the complementarity regime, 
complementarity could prove to be a great strength of the ICC. 
IV. MAXIMIZING COMPLEMENTARITY AS A STRENGTH FOR THE ICC 
Two developments would advance complementarity as a strength of 
the Court. The first is to reconceptualize what is meant by “success” of the 
ICC, and the second is to implement an even greater leadership role for the 
ICC in positive complementarity efforts than is already occurring. 
A. Reconceptualizing “Success” 
Generally, evaluation measures for a court will be in terms of the 
number and types of cases tried and the fairness of the proceedings.49 This 
is true for national courts and international ones.50 On the international 
 
 
 47. There is also greater flexibility in national jurisdictions—e.g., in Uganda, the International 
Crimes Division has jurisdiction over other transnational crimes—“genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes, terrorism, human trafficking, piracy and any other international crime [as provided for in 
other statutes].” See International Crimes Div., REP. OF UGANDA: THE JUDICIARY, http://www 
.judicature.go.ug/data/smenu/18/International_Crimes_Division.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2013). This, 
too, is an important aspect of national capacity building. There is more flexibility in national 
jurisdictions than in international tribunals to expand the types of crimes over which they exercise 
authority. 
 48. See Marong, supra note 35, at 73–74, 78–87 (describing Uganda’s adoption of an 
International Crimes Act with the goal of trying serious international crimes domestically). 
 49. See James Cockayne, The Fraying Shoestring: Rethinking Hybrid War Crimes Tribunals, 28 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 616, 621–24 (2004) (positing several measures of success for international 
tribunals including expeditiousness of proceedings, fairness, transparency, historical documentation, 
inclusion of victims, reconciliation, increasing respect for the rule of law, and strengthening the 
judicial system); see also the discussion of requirement of fair standards in the context of transfers to 
Rwanda from the ICTR. Marong, supra note 35, at 95–96. 
 50. For example, other international criminal courts have been criticized for either a lack of 
impartiality/victor’s justice or the small number of cases. See, e.g., regarding the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC): Seeta Scully, Judging the Successes and Failures of the 
Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia, 13 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 300, 325–34 
(2011) (lack of impartiality); Padraic J. Glaspy, Justice Delayed? Recent Developments at the 
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level, for instance, the ICTY takes pride in the number of cases tried and 
the significance of the accused that have been brought to justice. Reports 
to the United Nations51 and information on the ICTY’s website52 
emphasize the numbers and the high-level accused as evidence of the 
accomplishments of the tribunal. The ICTY also prides itself on 
conducting proceedings in accord with international due process 
principles.53 
As a court, the ICC must have credibility, legitimacy, and impartiality 
in its judicial operations in order to be a “success.” Its role as a court is 
important in how it tries cases and in ensuring accountability for serious 
international crimes. It is certainly valid to evaluate the Court on this 
basis. The nature of the proceedings, and even the number of cases, is 
highly visible, publicized, and analyzed. The website is devoted to the 
investigations and cases and well documented.54 Thus, the objective of 
demonstrating fair and impartial proceedings is well documented.  
 
 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 143, 153–54 (2008) (lack 
of impartiality); Leah Chavla, Southeast Asia and Oceana: Cambodia’s Human Rights Progress and 
National Reconciliatory Efforts in Jeopardy, 18.2 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 30, 40 (Winter 2011) (small 
number of individuals on trial). Regarding the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), see 
Lars Waldorf, “A Mere Pretense of Justice”: Complementarity, Sham Trials, and Victor’s Justice at 
the Rwanda Tribunal, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1221, 1271–76 (2010) (criticizing the prosecution of 
only one side of the conflict); Leslie Haskell & Lars Waldorf, The Impunity Gap of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Causes and Consequences, 34 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 49, 
70–78 (2011) (contrasting the ICTY and SCSL which prosecuted all sides of the conflict with the 
ICTR prosecuting only one side). Regarding the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL): Charles 
Chernor Jalloh, Special Court for Sierra Leone: Achieving Justice?, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 395, 418–22 
(2011) (describing criticisms of the small number of prosecutions); Donna E. Arzt, Views on the 
Ground: The Local Perception of International Criminal Tribunals in the Former Yugoslavia and 
Sierra Leone, 603 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 226, 233 (2006) (commenting on mixed 
views in Sierra Leone about the small number of prosecutions). 
 51. Report of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Doc. A/67/214–S/2012/592, 
¶¶ 2, 67–68 (Aug. 1, 2012), available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20 
Publications/AnnualReports/annual_report_2012_en.pdf; Report of the International Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, Doc. A/66/210–S/2011/473, ¶¶ 54–57 (July 31, 2011), available at http://www 
.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/AnnualReports/annual_report_2011_en.pdf. 
 52. ICTY, Key Figures, http://www.icty.org/sections/TheCases/KeyFigures (last visited Dec. 12, 
2012); ICTY, Timeline, http://www.icty.org/action/timeline/254 (last visited Dec. 20, 2012); ICTY, 
About the ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY (last visited Dec. 18, 2012) (noting the 
numbers indicated and that the accused have been “heads of state, prime ministers, army chiefs-of-
staff, interior ministers and many other high- and mid-level political, military and police leaders”). 
 53. ICTY, About the ICTY, supra note 52. 
 54. News and Highlights, ICC, http://icc-cpi.int/EN_Menus/icc/Pages/default.aspx (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2013). The website links to updates on the situations currently under investigation at the 
Court, as well as all the documents relevant to each prosecution, categorized by which organ of the 
Court produced each. The website also provides extensive information regarding the Court’s activities, 
including briefings from the OTP, public statements from various organs, press releases, and 
documentation such as policy papers and findings of various working groups. Additionally, the 
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Although the value and importance of the judicial proceedings should 
not be understated, it is also important in the case of the ICC to develop a 
measure for its role in complementarity. One often hears that the ICC 
would be a success if it had no cases at all.55 This might be true for any 
court, but it is especially true for the ICC because of the principle of 
complementarity. No cases in the ICC should mean that national 
jurisdictions are trying cases of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity. The problem with defining success in terms of no cases is that it 
is difficult for people to credit a negative or a void, even if theoretically 
one accepts the idea.  
If we accept that the success of the ICC is dependent upon the two 
major prongs of (1) fair and impartial operation of judicial proceedings 
when they are needed, and (2) the increasing ability of national 
jurisdictions to prosecute international crimes, then we should look at 
tangible measures of both prongs. Additionally, the ICC and the 
international community need to build the paradigm of “success” as 
comprising both prongs. As mentioned above, the judicial proceedings are 
well documented, and it is clear that they are a major focus of how the 
ICC is viewing its accomplishments. It will also be important for the ICC 
to have substantive content and visibility in its efforts to build national 
capacity so that this, too, is viewed as a major accomplishment of the 
Court. The resolutions of the Assembly of States Parties (“ASP”)56 and the 
reports to the ASP from the Bureau of the Assembly (an executive 
committee of the ASP)57 and the Court58 emphasize the importance of 
national capacity building and those documents describe various activities 
by the Court to foster these efforts. However, the various efforts by the 
Court to assist national jurisdictions do not get equal time on the website 
or in the literature on the accomplishments of the Court. In part, this is due 
 
 
website provides information about the history and structure of the Court as well as legal texts and 
legal tools. Finally, the website contains the activities and documentation of the ASP. 
 55. See Burke-White, supra note 4, at 54 (stating that Court could be viewed as a failure because 
of false expectations regarding the number of cases); Jalloh, supra note 30, at 218 n.60 (citing to 
statement by Prosecutor Luis Moreno-O’Campo that a high number of cases in the ICC would not 
measure Court’s efficiency). 
 56. Resolutions and Declarations Adopted by the Review Conference, Res. RC/Res.1 (June 8, 
2010); Resolutions Adopted by the ASP, Res. ICC-ASP/10/Res.5, ¶¶ 58–63 (Dec. 21, 2011); 
Resolutions and Recommendations Adopted by the ASP, Res. ICC-ASP/11/Res.6 (Nov. 21, 2012). 
 57. Report of the Bureau on Complementarity to the 11th Session of the ASP, Nov. 14–22, 2012, 
Doc. ICC-ASP/11/24 (Nov. 7, 2012) [hereinafter Bureau Report to ASP 11], available at http://www 
icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP11/ICC-ASP-11-24-ENG.pdf. 
 58. Report on the Activities of the Court to the 11th Session of the ASP, Nov. 14–22, 2012, Doc. 
ICC-ASP/11/21 (Oct. 9, 2012), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP11/ICC-ASP 
-11-21-ENG.pdf. 
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to the recency of the efforts and, in part, this is due to the lesser role that 
the positive complementary efforts play. To give full effect to the 
complementarity role, it is imperative that the efforts on national capacity 
building be recognized and developed further so that they do have an equal 
role. A number of prominent non-governmental organizations have 
similarly called for extensive work on national capacity building.59 The 
next part develops ideas on how the ICC as an institution might accentuate 
its positive complementary work. An increased focus on “success” as 
measured by assistance in national capacity building would partially 
diminish the first potential weakness from complementarity. In other 
words, the inherent secondary status of the Court would be redefined as a 
strength from the correlative increase in national prosecutions of 
international crimes. 
B. Increased Leadership Role in Building National Capacity 
If the ICC as an institution is measured not only by the cases it tries, 
but also by its efforts in national capacity building, then it is worthwhile to 
examine what the ICC is doing now and to explore what actions the 
institution might consider to increase its efforts. The ASP, the OTP, and 
the Court itself are all fostering positive complementarity through various 
efforts. In this part, it is suggested that the ICC could expand these efforts 
and gain greater recognition for them through creation of an Institute or 
Center within the institutional structure or in collaboration with an outside 
organization. 
Without question, there is an increased emphasis on what the Court can 
do to assist efforts to build national capacity to investigate and prosecute 
cases. Resolutions from the Kampala Review Conference, subsequent 
reports by the Secretariat and the Court, and a resolution from the most 
recent ASP meeting, the 11th Session in November 2012, indicate the 
importance of positive complementarity. 
The significance given to building national capacity at the Kampala 
Review Conference in 2010 is especially evident because there were so 
 
 
 59. Open Soc’y Justice Initiative, Building on the Complementarity Consensus: Background for 
the ICC Assembly of States Parties, at 4 (Briefing Paper Oct. 2012), http://www.opensociety 
foundations.org/sites/default/files/complementarity-asp-10152012.pdf [hereinafter OSJI Background 
Paper]; International Center for Transitional Justice, Stocktaking: Complementarity, Report to the 
Rome Statute Review Conference, June 2010 (May 2010), http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-
RSRC-Global-Complementarity-Briefing-2010-English.pdf [hereinafter ICTJ Stocktaking]; see also 
Burke-White, supra note 4, at 68 (suggesting a need for a formal policy of proactive complementarity 
in the Office of the Prosecutor). 
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many major issues that were on the table to be discussed.60 The fact that 
domestic competence to try international crimes was the subject of 
discussion indicates its importance to the ASP. For example, the Report of 
the Bureau on Stocktaking stated that complementarity referred to the need 
to focus on complementarity “as it is imperative to further the fight against 
impunity both at the international and at the national level . . . .”61 A 
resolution emerging from the Review Conference recognized the necessity 
of national capability and specified some actions that should be taken. The 
resolution “[e]ncourages the Court [and others] to explore ways in which 
to enhance the capacity of national jurisdiction . . .”62 and “[r]equests the 
Secretariat . . . to facilitate the exchange of information between the Court, 
States Parties and other stakeholders . . . aimed at strengthening domestic 
jurisdictions . . . .”63 
The most recent statement by the 11th session of the ASP in November 
2012 echoes the commitment to national capacity building. The ASP 
resolved “[t]o enhance the capacity of national jurisdictions to prosecute 
the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of international concern in 
accordance with internationally recognized fair trial standards, pursuant to 
the principle of complementarity.”64  
In preparation for the 11th session of the ASP, the Bureau, the 
Secretariat, and the Court prepared reports on their activities. Among its 
activities, the Secretariat noted that it has connected various actors, who 
can assist with knowledge and skills, with interested States65 consulted 
with organs of the Court how they might exchange information, such as 
for a judicial training project,66 and created the Complementarity Extranet, 
which is designed to bring together those with expertise with States that 
need assistance.67 The Bureau’s report summarized the work of the 
 
 
 60. The issues raised at the Kampala Review Conference included defining the crime of 
aggression, expanding the definition of war crimes, strengthening the enforcement of sentences, and 
working toward greater justice for victims of international crimes. Resolutions and Declarations 
Adopted by the Review Conference, Doc. RC/11 (June 8–11, 2010). 
 61. Bureau Report to ASP 8, supra note 4, ¶ 3. 
 62. Resolutions and Declarations Adopted by the Review Conference, Res. RC/Res.1, ¶ 8 (June 
8, 2010). 
 63. Id. ¶ 9. 
 64. Resolutions and Recommendations Adopted by the ASP, Res. ICC-ASP/11/Res.6, ¶ 1 (Nov. 
21, 2012). 
 65. Report of the Secretariat on Complementarity to the 11th Session of the ASP, Nov. 14–22, 
2012, Doc. ICC-ASP/11/25, ¶ 3 (Oct. 16, 2012) [hereinafter Secretariat Report to ASP 11]. 
 66. Id. ¶ 5. 
 67. Id. ¶¶ 6–8. In particular with regard to the Extranet, the ICC website has forms that can be 
utilized by either organizations with expertise or States that need assistance. According to the Report, 
the “Extranet is intended to provide an information base on events relating to complementarity, 
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Secretariat, the Court, and the international community.68 The report noted 
the Secretariat’s work in building the Extranet and facilitating connections 
between those involved in complementarity efforts.69 The report further 
commented on the Court’s Legal Tools Project, which contains 
international and national legal documents, cases, and other resources for 
managing cases of international crimes.70 The exit strategies of the Court 
from situations in which it has been engaged were noted as a way in which 
to include some type of complementarity activity.71 The Bureau report also 
described the extensive efforts of the United Nations through various 
entities, such as the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
and the U.N. Development Programme (“UNDP”), on rule of law projects 
that build national capacity.72 The report further noted the work of the 
UNDP, the International Center for Transitional Justice, and the focal 
point countries of Denmark and South Africa in integrating 
complementarity work into rule of law efforts.73 The Report of the Court 
on Complementarity for the ASP meeting was similarly descriptive and 
detailed both actions by the Court to assist states and a highly useful list of 
thematic areas that states need to address to build capacity.74 The report 
noted advice, exchange of information, and the Legal Tools Project that 
the Court has engaged in to assist States.75 The thematic areas are a 
blueprint for developing national capacity to handle international crimes. 
The areas include legislation on the substantive law and procedure, 
witness and victim protection and support, adequate legal representation, 
outreach, victim participation and reparations, court management, training 
and advice, supplies and resources, security, forensic expertise, 
centralization of judicial information, and mutual judicial assistance.76 
 
 
identify the main actors and their activities, and facilitate contacts between donor States, international 
and regional organizations, civil society and recipients . . . .”  
 68. Report of the Bureau on Complementarity to the 11th Session of the ASP, Nov. 14–22, 2012, 
Doc. ICC-ASP/11/24 (Nov. 7, 2012) [hereinafter Bureau Report to ASP 11]. 
 69. Id. ¶ 14. 
 70. Id. ¶ 18; see also ICC, What Are the ICC Legal Tools?, http://www.legal-tools.org/en/what-
are-the-icc-legal-tools/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2013) (The Legal Tools “equip users with legal 
information, digests and an application to work more effectively with core international crimes 
cases”). 
 71. Bureau Report to ASP 11, supra note 68,  ¶ 20. 
 72. Id. ¶ 25. Other U.N. agencies mentioned include the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 
the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, U.N. Women, the U.N. Children’s Fund, and the U.N. High 
Commission for Refugees. 
 73. Id. ¶ 26. 
 74. Report of the Court on Complementarity to the 11th Session of the ASP, Oct. 16, 2012, Doc. 
ICC-ASP/11/39 [hereinafter Court Report to ASP 11]. 
 75. Id. ¶¶ 9–10.  
 76. Id. ¶¶ 13–57. 
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Within each category, there is more detailed information about what is 
required to build a strong system. In other reports, efforts by the OTP to 
assist national prosecutions were also described.77 
Despite the plethora of activities and the strong statements encouraging 
national capacity building, the ASP and the Court have also made it clear 
that the ICC is not the primary actor in leading positive complementarity 
efforts. For example, the Bureau’s report on complementarity for the 2010 
Review Conference indicated that the Court should not “become a 
development organization or an implementing agency.”78 Instead, they 
suggested that the Court should be a “catalyst of direct State-to-State 
assistance and indirect assistance through relevant international and 
regional organizations and civil society. . . .”79 Similarly, in the Bureau’s 
2012 report on complementarity to the ASP, the Bureau commented: 
States Parties and the Court have expressed the view that the role of 
the Court itself is limited in actual capacity-building for the 
investigation and prosecution of Rome Statute crimes ‘in the field’. 
Rather this is a matter for States, the United Nations and relevant 
specialized agencies, other international and regional organizations 
and civil society. The Court can in the course of implementing its 
core mandate in some ways assist national jurisdictions thereby 
contributing to the functioning of the Rome Statute System. The 
Assembly of States Parties has an important role to play in 
sustaining and furthering the efforts of the international community 
in strengthening national jurisdictions through complementarity 
activities, thereby enhancing the fight against impunity.80 
Thus, the current position is that the ASP and the Court have a strong 
interest and stake in developing national capacity, but they should be 
considered facilitators or assistants rather than the primary actors for 
promoting such developments.81 
There are reasons for assuming a secondary role. One is a concern with 
compromising the impartiality of the judicial mandate of the court,82 and a 
 
 
 77. For example, in the Report on the Activities of the Court to the 11th Session of the ASP, 
Nov. 14–22, 2012, Doc. ICC-ASP/11/21 (Oct. 9, 2012), there is mention of OTP interaction with 
Colombian and Guinean authorities on national prosecutions. 
 78. Bureau Report to ASP 8, supra note 4. 
 79. Id. ¶ 42. 
 80. Bureau Report to ASP 11, supra note 68, ¶ 9. 
 81. See Heller, supra note 10, at 106 (commenting that “the ICC has essentially outsourced 
responsibility for upgrading national legal systems to states and NGOs”). 
 82. See also Burke-White, supra note 4, at 98–99 (referring to possible conflict of interest for 
OTP if a state that OTP has assisted subsequently challenges admissibility and argues that it is 
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second reason is the cost of undertaking more involved efforts.83 Despite 
these concerns, the ICC would position itself better as a successful force in 
international criminal justice if the institution took on a leadership role in 
this area and engaged in even more systematic and institutionalized 
efforts. While NGOs and governmental organizations,84 such as the 
European Union, play a very significant role, the Court as an institution 
should be at the center of these efforts. If part of the measure of the 
success of the ICC is in not having cases, but in fostering prosecutions in 
national jurisdictions, then it would benefit both the image of the ICC and 
accountability in general if the ICC becomes the leading entity in 
promoting national capacity.85 The Court should also get recognition and 
respect for these efforts.  
One way in which the ICC as an institution could assume a leadership 
role would be to create an Institute or Center that would be separate from 
the Court. Such an Institute could either be a new entity created by the 
ASP or could be an independent entity developed in collaboration between 
the ASP and another organization. The Institute could organize and lead 
 
 
satisfactorily moving forward because of OTP’s assistance). 
 83. See ICTJ Stocktaking, supra note 59, at 2 (mentioning the concern of states parties regarding 
cost). 
 84. See, e.g., Eur. External Action Serv., Reply of the European Union in response to the request 
for information in paragraph 6, sub-paragraph (h) of the Plan of Action for achieving universality and 
full implementation of the Rome Statute, ¶ 2.8 (Oct. 6, 2011), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/ 
NR/rdonlyres/9A7562A4-9BB5-4ACA-92F2-FEB7BFE7FE3B/284038/ICCASP10POA2011EUENG 
.pdf (explaining that the EU is taking the lead on developing a “complementarity toolkit” as a 
guidebook for future efforts toward capacity-building); OPEN SOC’Y FOUND., HANDBOOK FOR RULE-
OF-LAW POLICYMAKERS, DONORS, AND IMPLEMENTERS (Nov. 2011), available at http://www.open 
societyfoundations.org/reports/international-crimes-local-justice (“The handbook takes a step-by-step 
approach to the elements required to ensure that a trial meets international fair trial standards, while 
engaging the local affected communities in the process of justice, steps ranging from the provision of 
witness protection capacity, to efforts to educate local journalists and community leaders.”); 
Implementation of the Rome Statute, COAL. FOR THE ICC (last visited Oct. 20, 2013), http://www.icc 
now.org/?mod=romeimplementation (describing the Coalition’s efforts toward capacity-building in 
implementation of the Rome Statute by sharing documents, legal advice, and prior experiences with 
the process); see also Review Conference of the Rome Statute, May 31-June 11, 2010, Focal Points’ 
Compilation of Examples of Projects Aimed at Strengthening Domestic Jurisdictions to Deal with 
Rome Statute Crimes for the Review Conference of the Rome Statute (May 30, 2010), available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/RC2010/Stocktaking/RC-ST-CM-INF.2-ENG.pdf (describing 
efforts by multiple entities, including the ICC itself, ICTY, UN agencies, NGOs, and governmental 
organizations).  
 85. See Burke-White, supra note 4, at 73–76 (discussing proactive complementarity as a way in 
which OTP can better meet the high expectations for the ICC and better achieve accountability for 
international crimes); see also ICTJ Stocktaking, supra note 59, at 3 (suggesting that coordination is 
needed by the ICC to avoid piecemeal approaches to complementarity); Katharine A. Marshall, 
Prevention and Complementarity in the International Criminal Court: A Positive Approach, 17 NO. 2 
HUM. RTS. BRIEF 21, 24 (2010) (suggesting that the ICC could be a facilitator for outside 
organizations). 
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the various efforts in national capacity building. The impartiality issue for 
the judges and other Court personnel could be addressed by making the 
Institute separate from the operations of the ICC as a court. Additionally, 
the cost could be kept at a modest level if the ASP relied on NGOs, 
academics, and others to implement the training or other programs. 
The Open Society Justice Initiative (“OSJI”), in its October 2012 
background paper for the November ASP meeting, called for greater ASP 
activity in increasing political will, education about the Court, information 
exchange, and sustaining and assessing state engagement.86 Similar to 
those suggestions, I would suggest that the Institute include at least 
(1) facilitation of training programs; (2) coordination of international 
participation or advice in national prosecutions; and (3) publications. 
Training programs for judges, prosecutors, investigators, defense 
counsel, victims’ counsel, interpreters, and victim and witness protection 
personnel could be modeled on something like the judicial college87 in the 
United States or judicial training institutes in other parts of the world.88 
The cost can be minimized by using speakers from NGOs, academia, and, 
as appropriate, from the Court personnel. Other parts of the training 
programs could include sessions on legislation to implement the Rome 
Statute and infrastructure advice.  
A second activity, coordinating assistance or participation of 
international lawyers and judges in national prosecutions, could be one of 
the most innovative areas. For instance, the Institute could coordinate 
providing an international judge to sit on a mixed court in a national 
jurisdiction or to be an advisor for a national court. These would not be the 
same judges as are appointed to the permanent Court, so a concern with 
maintaining impartiality and availability would be avoided. Instead, the 
Institute could maintain a list of individuals available to serve as judges or 
attorneys, much as we have in an arbitration system on domestic and 
international levels.89 The expense would be contained because the State 
 
 
 86. OSJI Background Paper, supra note 59, at 2–3.  
 87. See A Legacy of Learning, THE NAT’L JUDICIAL COLL., http://www.judges.org/about/ 
history.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2013) (“By offering an average of 95 courses/programs annually 
with more than 3,000 judges attending from all 50 states, U.S. territories and more than 150 countries, 
the NJC seeks to further its mission of advancing justice through judicial education.”). 
 88. See, e.g., Judicial Education—Other Countries, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/ijr/ 
jud_education_other.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2013) (describing a list of judicial training programs in 
countries other than the U.S.); see also ERSUMA (Benin), available at http://www.ohada.org/ 
ersuma.html (referring to the École Régionale Supérieure de la Magistrature, the judicial training arm 
of OHADA, the Organisation pour l'Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires). 
 89. See, e.g., About Us, PERMANENT CT. OF ARBITRATION, http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage 
.asp?pag_id=1027 (last visited Oct. 20, 2013) (describing the activities of the court, including 
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involved would fund the cost of having an international judge or lawyer in 
its national process. 
The third prong suggested is publications. The purpose is twofold. 
First, the Institute would be a valuable resource if it consolidated all of the 
materials that are presently being generated by NGOs, governmental 
organizations, and academic institutions. Second, it would benefit the ICC 
as an institution to have something tangible to document what the Court is 
doing to build national capacity. Just as extensive information about 
situations and cases are available on the website, there could also be 
expanded categories dedicated to capacity-building activities. There are 
already beginning steps in the Complementarity forms and the Legal Tools 
Project on the website.90 This recommendation is to heighten the visibility 
of those steps, along with other efforts. 
A feasibility and cost study would be needed, but involvement in an 
Institute might also be considered “cost necessary.” If an objective, as 
already identified by the ASP, is to help build national capacity, and this 
may at some point in the future be a primary objective if there are few 
cases before the Court, then it would be far better to put it in place now. 
Another issue to study is whether amendments would have to be made 
to the Rome Statute to create a second entity, an Institute. Certainly, the 
current positive complementarity activities are occurring under the present 
statute. This even includes some of the activities of the Secretariat of the 
ASP.91 The objective of assisting with national capacity building is found 
within the concept of complementarity embedded in the statute.92 
 
 
assistance in the selection of arbitrators and ability to function as appointing authority as needed in the 
resolution of international disputes); ICC International Court of Arbitration, INT’L CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE, http://www.iccwbo.org/about-icc/organization/dispute-resolution-services/icc-internation 
al-court-of-arbitration/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2013) (explaining that, due to its global network, the court 
can appoint an arbitrator with the necessary expertise for any type of business dispute); Arbitrators 
and Mediators, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, http://www.adr.org (last visited Oct. 20, 2013) (follow 
“Arbitrators and Mediators” hyperlink) (noting that the organization maintains a roster of arbitrators 
with various qualifications and areas of expertise); see also Burke-White, supra note 4, at 96 
(suggesting a similar idea for OTP—that they should keep a list of experts).  
 90. Complementarity, ICC, http://icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/complementarity/Pages/default.aspx 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2013); What are the ICC Legal Tools?, LEGAL-TOOLS.ORG, http://www.legal-
tools.org/en/what-are-the-icc-legal-tools/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2103) (Legal Tools project). 
 91. The Secretariat reports to the ASP and is administratively located within the Registry. See 
Establishment of the Permanent Secretariat of the Assembly of States Parties to the International 
Criminal Court, Doc. ICC-ASP/2/Res.3 (Sept. 12, 2003), available at http://icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_ 
docs/Publications/Compendium/Compendium.3rd.21.ENG.pdf 
 92. Rome Statute, supra note 5, at 3, 12; see also Burke-White, supra note 4, at 76–82 
(discussing the provisions of the Rome Statute that govern the interaction between OTP and states, and 
commenting on the purpose and consistency of those provisions with proactive complementarity). 
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Moreover, the idea of assistance to States, such as in Article 93 (10),93 also 
conveys an underlying intent to work with national jurisdictions. 
Nevertheless, more specific provisions might be needed unless the 
Institute was considered part of one of the present organs of the Court or 
was established by the ASP in collaboration with an outside organization. 
CONCLUSION 
The Assembly of States Parties of the ICC has identified and 
emphasized an objective of positive complementarity, or building national 
capacity to adjudicate the Rome Statute crimes. There is tremendous 
opportunity for positive complementarity to become one of the most 
important achievements of the ICC as an institution. With 
complementarity as an underlying principle of the Court, a measure of the 
success of the ICC will be in the development of national capacity to 
prosecute serious international crimes. It is often stated that the ICC would 
be a success if it had no cases to try because national jurisdictions were 
assuming the responsibility to prosecute.94 This type of success, however, 
is dependent upon building national capacity and in redefining the purpose 
of the ICC as an institution. 
Complementarity is likely to prove to be a strength of the ICC. Despite 
potential weaknesses in positioning the ICC as secondary to national 
prosecutions, the ICC could make positive complementarity its flagship in 
the future. This would adjust the emphasis on the judicial function and the 
number of cases tried to include building national capacity as an equal 
partner in defining the success or achievements of the Court. In order to 
make this adjustment, both the ICC as an institution and the international 
community need to focus on this reconfiguration. 
The reconfiguration of the ICC to encompass a focus on positive 
complementarity is already ongoing, but it is not receiving sufficient 
recognition. The ASP through the Secretariat and the organs of the Court 
are assisting national capacity building through information sharing, 
training, and coordination with outside organizations. The ICC, however, 
is deliberately not taking on a leadership role in these activities. Although 
there are understandable concerns of maintaining impartiality of the 
 
 
 93. See, e.g., Johan D. van der Vyver, Time is of the Essence: The In-Depth Analysis Chart in 
Proceedings Before the International Criminal Court, 48 NO. 4 CRIM. L. BULL. ART. 1, 11 (2012) 
(suggesting that art. 93(10) is the authority for positive complementarity as it provides that the ICC 
may cooperate and assist states with investigations and trials). 
 94. See, e.g., supra note 55. 
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judicial function and the cost of more activities, the ICC as an institution 
could greatly benefit from increasing its visibility in the area of national 
capacity building. Especially if a measure of the importance of the Court is 
in its assistance in increasing national ability to prosecute international 
crimes, it would be to the ICC’s advantage to take a leading role and to 
emphasize its activities on its website and other publications. 
One way in which the ICC could establish a greater role in positive 
complementarity is through the creation of an Institute or Center dedicated 
to its work on national capacity building. The Institute should be 
independent of the judicial function to avoid any conflict of interest or 
impingement on the impartiality of the Court. The cost of such an Institute 
could be contained by utilizing the vast array of outside organizations that 
are already engaged in capacity building work. The Institute would be 
valuable in coordinating the efforts, disseminating information, and 
providing leadership.  
Complementarity presently is both an advantage and a challenge for the 
ICC. A consequence of complementarity is that, now and in the future, the 
ICC will be significant both for the trials it conducts and for its impact on 
national capacity to try international crimes. Increasing the emphasis on 
building national capacity as an objective and achievement of the ICC as 
an institution is likely to help ensure that complementarity is a strength in 
the future. 
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